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ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes the significance of the 12 June 2008 Lisbon Treaty referendum 
in the Republic of Ireland. This was the third such referendum on Europe held in 
Ireland since the millennium, and the second referendum in three to result in a 
rejection of an EU Treaty following the failed Nice poll in 2001. Assessing both the 
campaign itself and the reasons for the No vote, the article argues that whilst variables 
such as age, educational attainment, geography, gender and social class all have a part 
to play in explaining the outcome of the referendum, post-referendum analysis 
suggests that two key phenomena proved decisive. First, an enduring Irish attachment 
to an overwhelmingly exclusivist national identity rather than more open and fluid 
identity conceptions, means that a space exists where issues such as neutrality, 
sovereignty and Ireland’s relative influence in the EU institutional matrix can be 
readily exploited by opponents of the European integration process, and where any 
changes in the EU constitutional order can be emotively presented as an existential 
threat to Ireland’s values and interests. Second, post-referendum analysis also 
suggests that lack of knowledge constituted a key reason for voting No. The absence 
of any effort by government to provide and promote sufficient information channels 
which explain how and why Ireland’s EU membership matters means that EU 
‘debates’ within Irish political culture are frequently characterised by apathy, 
confusion, and ignorance, in a context where the chasm in elite-popular opinion has 
grown wider. The referendum result also points to a growing Eurosceptic tendency in 
Ireland which has seen the size of the No vote increase from 17 per cent in 1972 to a 
decisive majority of 53.4 per cent in 2008, on a significantly higher turnout than either 
2001 or 2002. 
 
ON 12 JUNE 2008, the Irish electorate went to the polls to vote on the adoption of the 
European Union’s (EU) Lisbon Treaty. This was the third such referendum on Europe 
held in Ireland since the millennium and the second referendum in three to result in a 
rejection of an EU Treaty following the failed Nice poll in 2001.2 The Lisbon Treaty 
was the eventual compromise agreed by EU leaders in the aftermath of the rejection 
of the Constitutional Treaty (CT) in popular referendums in France and the 
Netherlands in 2005. The Irish rejection of the Lisbon Treaty dealt an important blow 
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to the constitutionalization of the EU as the Treaty represented the culmination of a 
defined (if somewhat messy) constitutional process: Lisbon’s organic connection to 
the rejected Constitutional Treaty seems clear and the CT itself evolved out of a 
unique Constitutional Convention on the Future of Europe, instituted in February 
2002 after the EU’s Laeken Summit of December 2001. This article focuses on the 
Lisbon Treaty referendum in Ireland and analyses both the campaign itself and the 
reasons for the No vote. In doing so it draws upon the data presented in two key post-
referendum research papers.3 The first section sets out two significant background 
issues which help contextualise how the campaign unfolded. The second section 
focuses upon the campaign itself, the coalitions which emerged for and against the 
treaty, the key issues raised in the course of the campaign, and the controversy 
generated around these issues. It also analyses the polarisation of forces which 
manifested itself as anti-system Euro-sceptics hostile to the Treaty against the Euro-
enthusiasm or Euro-pragmatism of the mainstream political parties and supporters of 
the Treaty. The third section analyses the results of the poll and the reasons for the No 
vote and seeks to locate this analysis within a broader context of Irish engagement 
with the European Union.  
 
Background and Context 
 
Before considering how the campaign unfolded in Ireland there are two important 
background issues which need to be examined. The evolution of the EU constitutional 
order has seen member states develop their own specific instruments of legal 
adaptation amid a plurality of approaches to political legitimation in particularistic 
national contexts. In formal legal terms ratification is deemed the prerogative of each 
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individual member state and it is up to each state to decide its own preferred method 
of constitutional approval: in the case of the Lisbon Treaty 26 of the 27 states opted 
for a parliamentary vote.4 In the Irish case ratification takes place through popular 
referendum, on foot of the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in the celebrated 
Crotty case of 1987.5 The dominant interpretation of that judgment was that any 
further change in the EU constitutional order with implications for Irish sovereignty 
had to be legitimated through referendum rather than parliamentary statute. No Irish 
government has been prepared to challenge the constitutionality of an EU treaty 
before the Supreme Court since that time and no such action was contemplated in 
respect of the Lisbon Treaty. This is despite the fact that Crotty expressly authorises 
the ratification of EU treaties by statute provided that ‘such amendments do not alter 
the essential scope or objectives’ of the existing European Union.6 The only aspect of 
the Single European Act (SEA) that the Court felt required constitutional amendment 
- and this only by a 3 to 2 majority - was Title III, which pertained to European 
security and foreign policy. It is absolutely clear that all other institutional and 
procedural innovations contained in the Single European Act could as easily have 
been introduced by statute of the Oireachtas. Indeed, as Ruth Barrington points out, 
successive enlargements of the EU have been ratified by the Oireachtas rather than by 
referendum, and it is at least arguable that these have altered the essential scope 
and/or objectives of the EU far more than actual treaty change.7 Viewed from this 
perspective the government would have been perfectly justified in incorporating the 
very modest institutional changes attached to the Lisbon Treaty into Irish law by 
statute rather than constitutional amendment. Given that the Lisbon Treaty contained 
only limited movement towards further ‘deepening’ of foreign and security policy, 
and leaves intact each member state’s absolute sovereignty in foreign affairs, it might 
 3
have seemed to some as inherently sensible for the government to opt for 
parliamentary ratification or at least to test the constitutionality of the Lisbon Treaty 
before the Supreme Court in advance of or in preference to the much more risky route 
of a popular referendum. 
 
The government’s decision to proceed cautiously and avoid a confrontation with the 
Supreme Court was based on a strategic recognition that if the action failed it would 
have been presented by the No side as a deliberate effort to exclude the Irish people 
from the decision-making process and thus prove a significant weapon in the anti-
integrationist armoury in the course of a referendum campaign. The impression of a 
so-called ‘Euroelite’ going over the heads of the people, already popularly embedded, 
would no doubt be reinforced by such a turn of events. Thus for the Irish government 
calling a referendum represented the only sensible response to the Supreme Court 
decision which, in the opinion of one leading constitutional law expert, should have 
long ago been overruled or modified by the court itself.8  
 
A second key background issue was the change of Taoiseach. Bertie Ahern’s private 
life become more and more the defining issue of Irish politics subsequent to the 
general election of 2007 won by a Fianna Fáil-led coalition and he had to suffer the 
indignity of being dragged before a public tribunal of inquiry - the Mahon Tribunal - 
to explain how and why huge sums of money had been provided to him by 
businessmen on numerous occasions over a decade previously. Obsessed with the 
Tribunal, Ahern failed to concentrate on Lisbon early enough and dithered about 
naming the date, leaving a vacuum for the No camp to exploit. Opposition leaders 
complained vocally about the impact the delay was having on the Yes campaign. 
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Ahern finally announced his resignation on 2 April 2008 and thus the way was clear 
for finance minister, Brian Cowen, to assume the mantle of leadership of Fianna Fáil 
and Taoiseach. Political scientists will mull over the Ahern affect: was there an 
instrumental counter-plebiscitary effect arising out of the revelations about Bertie 
Ahern’s finances? Or was there a wider disaffection with party politics and distrust of 
political elites which resulted in the rejection of a position advocated by 90% of the 
members of parliament? At the very least the atmosphere of turbulence and semi-
permanent political crisis helped to distract attention from the substantive question at 
a crucial juncture.  
 
The Campaign: pro- and anti- Treaty coalitions and key issues 
 
From the outset of the campaign a clear polarization between Yes and No sides 
manifested itself as one of ‘political establishment’ insiders versus non-political or 
politically marginal outsiders, a not wholly new feature of Ireland’s European debate 
but arguably one of growing importance. Michael Holmes points out that the huge 
majority enjoyed by the Yes side in the original accession referendum in 1972 (83%) 
helped create a culture of complacency among Irish elites about referendum 
outcomes. This was reinforced by distance from the legislative process – only a small 
number of ministers and civil servants in Dublin and Brussels have had any 
substantive input into policy over the years. The extraordinary consensus amongst the 
political parties on EU membership combined with the vagaries of a political culture 
which has remained resolutely localist and clientelistic also helped insulate decision-
making on Europe from elected representatives as much as ordinary citizens.9 Over 
time this culture of official neglect and ignorance helped create opportunity structures 
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for smaller and politically marginal groups to effectively dominate the anti-
integrationist agenda and mobilise constituencies which felt largely ignored by the 
Europhile political parties.  
 
On the Yes side stood the Republic’s dominant political party, Fianna Fáil, as well as 
the two largest opposition parties, Fine Gael and Labour, and Fianna Fáil’s small 
coalition partner, the Progressive Democrats.10 The second party in the governing 
coalition, the Green Party, which had campaigned against previous EU treaties, and 
especially forcefully against the Nice Treaty in 2001 and 2002, did not take an 
explicit party position but its ministers performed a volte face and expressed 
unequivocal support for the Treaty. Other traditional supporters of the EU were also 
on board: the Irish Business and Employers Federation (IBEC), the Irish Chambers of 
Commerce, the Irish Congress of Trades Unions (ICTU), and a broad-ranging group 
called the Irish Alliance for Europe, a non-party, civil society umbrella group 
comprising academics, businesspeople, farmers, lawyers, students, and trade 
unionists. On the No side many of the party political actors were familiar from 
previous referendums on EU issues. Sinn Féin has been actively opposed to European 
integration since the 1972 referendum (though it professes itself to be a pro-European 
party). The second active political party was the Socialist Party which emerged out of 
the militant wing of the Labour party in the late 1980s but which lost its only Dáil seat 
in 2007. The Socialist Workers Party and the Communist Party of Ireland also 
campaigned against the Treaty, whilst independent Eurosceptic politicians such as 
MEP Kathy Sinnott and former MEP Dana Rosemary Scallon gave added voice to the 
opposition campaign. 
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The most visible and organizationally competent components of the No campaign, 
however, were not established political parties but rather activist groups and 
movements adhering either to a single issue objective, or, in a minority of cases, 
professing a broader critique of the European integration process. We can divide these 
groups into four distinct categories. The first such group coalesced around the desire 
to protect Irish sovereignty and identity against the alleged ambitions of the EU to 
both fully federate and militarise itself. The oldest of these groups is Anthony 
Coughlan’s National Platform which has been campaigning against European 
integration since the early 1970s when it was known as the Irish Sovereignty 
Movement (ISM).11 A second category of groups in this oppositionist strand is more 
explicitly concerned with developments in European foreign and security policy. The 
Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA), for example, campaigned against a ‘European 
Army’ and the European Defence Agency, whilst other group such as AfrI focus on 
development issues and Third World politics and the alleged imperialist biases and 
ambitions of the EU toward Africa in particular. At first glance it is not particularly 
obvious what unites these groups but concerns about neutrality, American aggression 
and hegemonic ambition, and EU militarisation featured strongly during the 
campaign. A second strand of the left opposition to Lisbon can be found amongst 
groups formed around welfare issues and social policy. As Michael Holmes 
demonstrates the left-wing critique has been a permanent feature of Irish opposition to 
European integration and concentrated outside of parliament (where there was 
virtually no voice) in interest groups.12 These groups include the People’s Movement 
and the People before Profit Alliance, which both emphasised strongly their view that 
the Lisbon Treaty constituted a vehicle for the privatization of public services. Other 
core concerns voiced amongst these groups included the alleged neoliberal bent of the 
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European Commission and the unelected ‘Brussels Bureaucracy’, the supposed ‘race 
to the bottom’ provoked by inter-state competition within the EU Single Market, and, 
at the individual level, by labour mobility (the Polish Plumber familiar from the 2005 
French referendum). 
 
If such left wing critiques are familiar from other jurisdictions there has also 
developed a distinct right wing Irish economic critique of the EU and on this occasion 
it was led spiritedly by a new group called Libertas. Led by Tuam-based multi-
millionaire businessman Declan Ganley, a newcomer to frontline politics and with 
connections to American defence and security interests, Libertas placed the alleged 
threat to Ireland’s laissez faire corporate tax regime at the centre of its campaign. And 
whilst it also invoked arguments about sovereignty, institutional power and Irish 
identity, its unique contribution to the campaign lay in its emphasis on the EU as an 
economic threat to Irish competitiveness, as something which no longer constituted an 
unvarnished public good from an Irish perspective. For the first time in an Irish 
referendum a significant number of prominent business people also publicly opposed 
the Treaty, though it is not clear that their opposition was based on any specific set of 
economic arguments. These included Ulick McEvaddy, Ben Dunne and the colourful 
Ryanair chief executive, Michael O’ Leary. Finally, on the conservative social right, 
the campaign featured a number of prominent ultra-Catholic groups led by Cóir which 
had been active over the previous decade or more.  Opposed to abortion, divorce and 
homosexuality, and arguing that the Lisbon Treaty would also encourage the growth 
of euthanasia and prostitution, Cóir’s particular focus during the campaign was the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights, which they alleged would be used as a Trojan horse 
to introduce extreme secular legislation which would further erode Irish identity and 
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attachment to Christianity. And although Cóir too utilised arguments about 
institutional power, the democratic deficit and sovereignty, its main emphasis was on 
conservative social values.  
 
So if these were the main actors active during the campaign what where the key issues 
which framed the debate? For the purposes of clarity and simplicity we can delineate 
along two clearly identifiable vectors. First, arguments about sovereignty and identity 
presented Lisbon either as a threat to or an enhancement of Ireland’s power and 
influence within the European Union and beyond. The second set of issues concerned 
the economy and the extent to which the Lisbon Treaty constituted a beneficial or 
negative change to Ireland’s economic position within the EU. In one form or another 
these two vectors have dominated Ireland’s seven referendums to date on EU issues. 
 
Turning first to the sovereignty and identity vector, one can identify two significant 
dimensions of the No campaign that presented Lisbon as an existential threat to Irish 
identity and national interests. The first was the institutional re-calibration which 
included changes to the structure of the Commission and the modus operandi of the 
Council of Ministers. Essentially these arguments were about Ireland’s voice and 
institutional representation in Brussels and the changes wrought by the Lisbon Treaty 
relative to the status quo. But they also included the nature of large state-small state 
relationships within the EU, the alleged ‘democratic deficit’ which the EU was said to 
suffer, the concept of citizenship in a national and European context and the nexus 
between Irish identity and European integration. The second element was the spectre 
of militarisation and the alleged development of a European Army as both undesirable 
of itself and as a threat to Irish neutrality, sovereignty and identity. Both arguments 
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were familiar from previous referendum campaigns.13 Both proved effective in 
mobilising No voters.  
 
The No side argued that the legitimacy of the EU depended on full and equal 
representation of all member states in the decision-making structures. The right of 
each state to a seat at the Commission table at all times was thus sacrosanct. Indeed 
the commitment to one commissioner per member state was a key principle of 
Ireland’s European policy until Nice. The loss of a commissioner for one term in 
three, effectively five years out of every fifteen, was presented by the No side as a 
significant further diminution of sovereignty and influence for Ireland with no 
compensating ‘side payments’ offered within the broader institutional matrix. Sinn 
Féin was particularly insistent that rejection of Lisbon would mean re-negotiation and 
the opportunity to keep a commissioner permanently. Their position can be summed 
up in Padraig MacLochlainn’s view: ‘For a small country like Ireland, it is vital to 
have a permanent voice at the European Commission table, especially when you 
consider that this country only has a small number of MEPs and our voting strength in 
the Council of Ministers will be halved if this is passed’.14 What Sinn Féin and others 
on the No side failed to point out was that Ireland, under the terms of the existing 
Nice Treaty, would potentially lose a commissioner as early as 2009. Under Lisbon 
that would not happen until 2014 at the earliest, and there existed the potential to 
retain commissioners under Lisbon if all member states so agree. Indeed the Irish 
Government, as part of its strategy for preparing a second referendum in 2009, was 
later able to secure agreement at the December 2008 European Council summit that 
each member would retain a permanent place at the Commission table.15 Bizarrely, as 
is illustrated by the discourse of both Sinn Féin and the National Platform, the very 
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actors who were now stressing the imperative of maintaining a permanent Irish 
commissioner had long presented the Commission as an über-centralising force of 
unelected, power-obsessed bureaucrats intent on reducing Irish national sovereignty 
as they accumulated more and more power. Public opinion analysed both during and 
after the campaign, demonstrated a strong attachment to the idea of a permanent Irish 
commissioner and in this sense the No argument was certainly a very persuasive one. 
At the very least it contributed to the agreement on a ‘one commissioner per member 
state’ rubric agreed at the December European Council. 
 
The second strand of the institutional power debate focused on changes to the voting 
weights in the Council of Ministers, the EU’s primary law-making body. The National 
Platform asserted that the Lisbon Treaty effectively doubled Germany’s weight within 
the Council from its present 8.5% to 17%. Similarly France and the UK would see 
their voting weight increased from their present 8% to 12% in a context where 
Ireland’s voting power would reduce from 2% to 0.8%. In combating these claims, 
supporters of the Treaty stressed that the changes in Quality Majority Voting (QMV) 
did not necessarily present a threat to Irish interests. In the consensus-seeking 
environment of Brussels the veto was little more than a mythical realpolitik construct: 
the consensual nature of EU decision-making processes is such that the zero sum 
calculations of the No side do not equate with reality. As Brigid Laffan pointed out: 
‘the hard evidence is that the EU system remains largely driven by consensus. Only 
25% of decisions that could have gone to a vote between 1994-2004 were voted on’.16 
Thus clashes about institutional power and Ireland’s voice in Brussels became an 
important part of the debate on the Lisbon Treaty as the campaign wore on. To the 
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extent that they resonated with concerns about Irish identity, influence and 
sovereignty they would play an important part in the outcome of the referendum. 
 
The issue of an emerging European defence and security policy has featured strongly 
in Ireland’s European debates since at least the Maastricht Treaty and was a 
significant concern among voters in the 2001 and 2002 Nice polls.17 A number of 
political parties, including Sinn Féin, along with a range of civil society groups such 
as PANA, coalesced around this theme and argued that Irish neutrality had been 
steadily eroded by successive treaties, and would be further compromised by Lisbon. 
In effect the No side sought to paint a picture of untrammelled 'movement' in the area 
of defence and security policy;  the Government could not be trusted to protect 
neutrality and indeed was suspected of colluding with other EU member states in the 
'creeping militarisation' of the EU. Those making the militarisation argument 
continually sought to link the EU to a militarist agenda18 and, despite all the evidence 
to the contrary, specifically to an American militarisation agenda. The Irish 
government’s decision to allow the US military to stop-over at Shannon airport from 
the outset of the Iraq War – itself not a decision but simply the continuation of a long-
standing agreement – was depicted as the thin end of the wedge, with a progressive 
movement toward a maximailst defence and security agenda. The No side made 
particularly effective use of the Lisbon Treaty’s incorporation of a European Defence 
Agency (EDA) ‘the function of which is to expand and improve EU military 
expenditure’ according to PANA’s Roger Cole and ‘will mean more arms exports and 
a boost to the global arms trade’.19 Thus the No side’s argument can be summed up as 
Lisbon not just enhancing EU security and defence capacity but indicative of a move 
toward centralization of military power and a more unified and aggressive (pro-
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American) EU posture in global politics. Yes campaigners struggled to convince 
voters that Ireland’s veto on foreign and security policy remained and that Lisbon 
constituted no threat to Irish sovereignty and institutional autonomy. The post-
referendum findings presented by Millward Brown IMS demonstrate the extent to 
which the No arguments resonated with voters: fear of conscription into a putative 
‘European army’ featured strongly in the reasons given by No voters for their 
rejection of the Treaty.20
 
From the beginning of the campaign issues related to Ireland’s place within the 
European and global economy featured strongly. Arguments revolved around the 
balance between capital and labour within a European integration context and the 
significance of the Lisbon Treaty for Ireland’s economic autonomy and international 
competitiveness. The curious nature of this conversation, much of it familiar from the 
French referendum of 2005, lay in the EU being interpreted in precisely the opposite 
terms according to the actor involved, the argument being advanced and the ideology 
underpinning the argument. The protection of Ireland’s corporate tax regime assumed 
a central place in the campaign of those on the right of the political spectrum such as 
Cóir and Libertas (but also curiously Sinn Féin, which styles itself as a socialist party) 
who were particularly eager to stress the competitive threat facing Ireland if Lisbon 
were to be ratified, with Libertas leader Declan Ganley claiming: ‘Ireland’s tax 
competitiveness is absolutely put into a very tenuous position’. Asserting that the 
mainstream political parties could not be trusted on the tax issue, Ganley argued that 
Ireland’s strategy should be to seek something stronger than the veto, namely a legally 
binding protocol which would guarantee absolute independence to set national tax 
policy and especially Ireland’s low rate of corporate tax.21 It was frequently asserted 
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that a large number of EU states, but particularly France as the incoming President of 
the EU, would push for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) on 
the basis of enhanced cooperation procedures which would effectively circumvent an 
Irish veto on corporate tax. With fiscal autonomy constrained by Ireland’s 
membership of the Eurozone tax policy was presented as the key contemporary 
instrument of sovereign economic power. In an economy plunging into recession, and 
with the Celtic Tiger era now a distant memory, these arguments received a serious 
hearing.22
 
In marked contrast the left critique of the European integration process focused on the 
alleged neoliberal bias of the European Union and the ongoing attacks on ‘Social 
Europe’ by the European Commission, corporate Europe and the European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) whose policy agenda invariably produces negative distributional 
asymmetries in Ireland. But whereas in France in 2005 social and economic issues 
dominated the campaign and arguments about EU market failure penetrated 
thoroughly through different sections of society, in Ireland this remained difficult for 
the Left. After all the Irish social model is a much more minimalist one than the 
French and so there is much less to ‘defend’ than in France when arguing against EU 
competition policy or open markets. Nevertheless for a good part of the left 
opposition to Lisbon, resistance to the rampantly neo-liberal ideology of ‘Brussels’, 
said to become even more entrenched with new articles in the Lisbon Treaty, was a 
key element in the propaganda battle with the spectre of Commission-led 
globalisation presented as an existential threat to the interests and welfare of Irish 
workers. A particular target of attack was the ECJ, which despite its record of robust 
interventionism on the side of workers rights, was routinely presented as a friend of 
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the market rather than the worker: ‘the court’s decisions are sustained attacks on the 
wages and working conditions of workers throughout the EU’ according to Roger 
Cole of PANA.23 The ECJ was continually interpreting the treaties in a way which 
favoured ‘competition’ over labour and local collective bargaining arrangements. In 
particular the Laval and Viking judgments featured strongly in No arguments, as 
‘evidence’ of ECJ perfidy.  
 
 
The outcome: Ireland votes no (again) 
 
It became apparent early in the count that a No vote was the certain outcome of the 
referendum. On a turnout of 53.13% the proposed constitutional amendment was 
defeated by 53.4% to 46.6%. The outcome was almost exactly that predicted by the 
Irish Times/TNSmrbi poll one week before polling.24 A total of 28.3% of the 
electorate voted No – compared with 24.7% of the electorate who voted Yes. This 
constituted a historical peak for the No side which, even in victory in 2001, had only 
garnered the support of 19% of the electorate. The margin of defeat, as Table 1 shows, 
was 110,000 out of an overall turnout of over 1.6 million people.25  
 
So what factors explain the outcome? Within days of the referendum the European 
Commission conducted an extensive survey of public opinion providing important 
data on voting behaviour.26 The first striking behavioural aspect of the outcome was 
the turnout. Prior to Lisbon most commentators expected that the higher the turnout 
the more likely it was that the Yes side would prevail. In 2002, for example, a marked 
increase in turnout compared to the 2001 poll (see Table 1) enabled the Yes side to 
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improve its vote enough to command a clear victory. But the Lisbon referendum, 
although producing a significantly higher turnout level than 2001or 2002, did not see 
this pattern repeated as most additional voters seem to have voted against the Treaty. 
The turnout figure (55.13%), while it compares poorly to the French referendum of 
2005 (69.3%), and to, for example, Danish referendums on EU issues, nevertheless 
was sufficiently healthy in an Irish plebiscitary context as to bestow added legitimacy 
to the result.  
 
Analysis of actual voting behaviour reveals some interesting comparative trends. Only 
10 of the 43 constituencies in the state voted in favour, in some cases by a slim 
majority. Whilst this was significantly better than 2001, when only 2 constituencies 
voted Yes and 39 against the Nice Treaty, it is strikingly different to 2002 when all 42 
constituencies recorded Yes majority votes. If nothing else these figures demonstrate 
the extreme volatility of constituency results across the three most recent 
referendums. The extent of the success of the No campaign’s arguments can be 
gleaned not just in the result of the referendum, but from the data presented in the 
post-referendum Eurobarometer survey and the Millward Brown IMS research. It 
showed that a large majority of Irish voters (68%) said the No campaign was the more 
convincing one, while only 15% said the same about the Yes campaign. Strikingly, 
even those who voted Yes were more likely to say that the No campaign was more 
persuasive (57% - compared to 29% who thought the Yes campaign was the more 
convincing one).  
 
Turning to a more sociological approach to the profile of Yes and No voters a number 
of issues arise. The first is the rural-urban divide. The constituencies which voted for 
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the Treaty were mostly in Leinster in the more densely populated east of the country 
close to Dublin. The sole constituency outside Leinster which voted Yes was Clare in 
the Midwest of the country. This suggests that a distinct rural-urban divide may now 
be a feature of Irish voting patterns on Europe, although some working class areas of 
Dublin also voted No. It is worth noting that in France in 2005 there was a similar 
large rural No vote in evidence. This was particularly pronounced among the French 
farmers who, like their Irish counterparts, have benefited disproportionately from the 
Common Agriculture Policy (CAP) over the years and yet seem less than reconciled 
to the European integration process.27 The strongest Yes vote, in the country was, 
unsurprisingly, recorded in affluent Dun Laoighaire in south east Dublin with a 63.5% 
Yes vote, the strength of which highlights the significant occupational polarization in 
voting patterns - attitudes to the EU derived from social status are quite striking in 
Ireland as elsewhere. One important manifestation of this cleavage can be evinced in 
turnout figures: while 57% of white collar workers voted only 48% of blue collar 
workers did so.28 There was considerable support for the Treaty among the liberal 
professional and executive classes, and educational attainment influencing subjective 
assessment of knowledge of the treaty proved a strong indicator of support for the 
Treaty. In fact during the campaign there was a 25 point gap between levels of 
subjectively assessed knowledge as between those in upper middle and middle class 
occupations and those in working class occupations.29 The Eurobarometer survey 
demonstrates that the main supporters of the Treaty were indeed to be found in the 
higher occupational classes: senior managers (66%), the ‘self-employed’ (60%), 
professionals (58%), and those with higher levels of education (57%).30 On the other 
hand blue collar voters were largely supportive of the No vote, especially those 
members of trade unions such as UNITE and the TEEU which urged their members to 
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vote No. Richard Sinnott argues that the social class cleavage may well constitute ‘a 
reflection of occupation-related differences in exposure to a vulnerability in the face 
of globalisation’. At the very least the combination of occupational difference plus the 
urban-rural divide produce ‘considerable socio-demographic contrasts in 
support/opposition to the treaty’.31  
 
The Eurobarometer survey also demonstrates that a higher proportion of younger 
people voted against the Treaty: among the 18-24 group fully 65% voted No, as 
against only 55% of over 55s. There is a direct link here to the question of knowledge 
of EU affairs in that there was a 13 point gap in levels of good/some knowledge 
between those under 25 and those aged 50 to 64. Turnout level was strongly related to 
age: of those who did not vote in the referendum, younger people were much less 
likely to participate than their older counterparts (64% of the 18-24 year-olds 
abstained compared to less than one third of the 55 plus age group).32 In France in 
2005 age also was clearly a factor with older and retired people much more likely to 
support the Constitution than younger people.33 Gender also appears to have been a 
somewhat influential variable. Lack of confidence in one’s knowledge was more 
prevalent amongst women, particularly amongst younger women – the gap between 
males and females among the under 25s was 16 percentage points, compared with 5 
points in the 50 to 64 group.34 The Eurobarometer survey demonstrated that women 
were firmly in the No camp with 56% voting against the Treaty compared to 51% of 
men.35
 
If this data provides valuable information about electoral behaviour there are two 
substantive issues which help us to contextualise that behaviour. The first is the way 
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in which Irish conceptions of identity may have influenced voters’ perceptions of the 
Lisbon Treaty and Ireland’s place in the integration process. The second is the 
question of knowledge. Richard Sinnott’s post-Lisbon analysis suggests a particular 
context in which identity matters in the Irish context. Voters testified that a major 
reason for voting No was to ‘keep Ireland’s power and identity’. Sinnott points out 
that Eurobarometer surveys reveal a distinct attachment amongst Irish respondents to 
an ‘Irish only’ identity over more open and cosmopolitan identity attachments. Fully 
59% of Irish respondents in 2008 rejected the proffered degrees of European identity 
and opted for an exclusive Irish identity, an increase from 49% in the Eurobarometer 
survey of autumn 2003. In fact amongst the EU27 only UK respondents exhibit a 
stronger attachment to an exclusivist conception of identity.36 John Coakley argues 
that notwithstanding the strong currents of support for European integration, Ireland’s 
enduring attachment to nationalist values should not be under-estimated: ‘a history of 
vigorous nationalist agitation, a tradition of suspecting powerful neighbours and a 
long-standing emphasis on national sovereignty have been outstandingly 
characteristic of Irish political culture’.37 Sinnott’s conclusion, a qualified one, is that 
‘running an integrationist referendum in a political culture in which almost two thirds 
of the electorate feel themselves to belong exclusively to a certain national identity is 
never going to be a walkover’.38 Fully 12% of respondents to the Eurobarometer 
survey voted No to ‘protect Irish identity’ (the second most important reason for 
voting No) suggesting that the identity dimension emerges as crucial in explaining the 
outcome of the referendum. At the very least this suggests that the undoubted material 
gains accrued by Ireland from participation in the European integration process.39 
have not contributed to any meaningful re-calibration of Irish identity conceptions and 
that the ‘European’ layer of Irish identity is in reality so thin that the consistently high 
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professions of support for the EU in opinion polls may now be considered highly 
suspect. Where that support has been tested at the ballot box, two out of the last three 
popular votes have produced anti-integrationist outcomes. 
 
The second substantive issue with a bearing on the outcome concerns voters’ 
knowledge about the Treaty and the EU more generally. Unlike elections, 
referendums focus on a single issue about which voters may or may not have adequate 
information or pre-existing opinions. A considerable body of data accumulated during 
previous referendums and from Eurobarometer tracking polls demonstrates that 
although the Irish remain amongst the most enthusiastic about EU membership, there 
remains a significant knowledge vacuum, with a large majority of citizens professing 
to know little or nothing about how decisions are made at EU level and how the EU 
institutions function. The failure of the 2001 Nice referendum may have sent 
shockwaves through the Irish body politic but it did not encourage any significant 
widening of the European conversation nor any government-sponsored campaign of 
civic education that may have helped break through the walls of ignorance. The 
Lisbon campaign then in some ways manifested a sense of ‘political Groundhog Day’ 
in that the lessons which should have been absorbed in 2001 clearly were not, with the 
result that Irish citizens were no better informed about the issues at stake at the 
beginning of the Lisbon campaign than they were at the outset of the Nice campaign 
in 2001. Eurobarometer polls consistently demonstrate that support for the EU is 
related to relative levels of knowledge. The post-referendum Eurobarometer survey 
confirmed that once again lack of knowledge constituted the most important reason 
for not voting (22%). Further data support this statistic: fully one fifth of No voters 
and one sixth of Yes voters did not know if the Lisbon Treaty would be good or bad 
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for Ireland.40 The evidence from the Millward Brown IMS research is even more 
striking: of those who abstained 46% cited lack of knowledge or information as their 
main reason for not voting, whilst, crucially, 42% of those who voted No also cited 
lack of knowledge and/or information.41
 
The significance of the knowledge vacuum is particularly evident in the strategies 
adopted by the No side in particular. Two specific approaches can be identified. First, 
the No campaign centred on short, sharp messages easily understood, which provided 
voters with easy to process (negative) images of the EU and the Lisbon Treaty, in 
contrast to the Yes messages which invariably came across as complex if not tortured 
(the EU as an abstract and variegated public good). Second, the No side demonstrated 
an ability and willingness to distort and misrepresent both the content of the Lisbon 
Treaty (especially institutional changes, tax arrangements and security and defence 
issues) and the nature of the European integration process. These arguments could 
only succeed in a political space characterised by confusion, ignorance and apathy on 
the part of an electorate lacking any substantive connection to or sense of ownership 
over the EU’s decision-making processes. That these arguments did succeed is 
confirmed by the findings of the post-referendum opinion polls: when voters were 
asked to identify what was in the Lisbon Treaty 65% identified ‘loss of a 
commissioner’; 42% endorsed the view that Lisbon ‘eroded Irish neutrality; 43% 
thought that Lisbon meant the ‘end of Ireland’s right to decide its own corporate tax 
rate’; 34% thought Lisbon would mean an ‘end to control over abortion’ and 33% 
thought the Treaty ‘would introduce conscription to a European army’.42  
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Turning finally to the party political arena there appears to have been significant 
divergence from party positions among party members.43 Table 2 shows the 
relationship between party identification and referendum in the three most recent EU-
related polls. Putting the Lisbon referendum under the party identification microscope 
it is clear that voters did not take their cures from the parties and political 
representatives they supported as recently as the 2007 general election. Party loyalty 
did not persuade voters to back the Yes campaign: only 60% of Fianna Fáil supporters 
voted Yes and just 51% of Fine Gael supporters voted in favour of the Treaty, whilst a 
majority of Labour and Green party supporters voted against. Most significant here 
are the 40% of Fianna Fáil supporters who voted against Lisbon as they constituted 
the single largest component of the No vote. Given that historically Fine Gael has 
been the party with the strongest support for the European integration process the 
latter figure appears particularly illuminating. Even in Fine Gael Leader Enda 
Kenny’s constituency of Mayo, the Treaty was rejected by a solid margin of 61.7% to 
38.3%. Clearly, except in the case of small parties Sinn Féin and the Progressive 
Democrats party loyalty was not a significant indicator of voting behaviour. It is also 
worth comparing the voting behaviour of Irish party members with those of French 
political parties in the 2005 referendum in France. Using exit polls Vivaldi 
demonstrates that UMP and UDF supporters voted massively in favour of the 
European Constitution with 80 and 76% of Yes votes respectively, a marked contrast 
with the voting behaviour of supporters of the three main Irish political parties in 
2008.44 Midway through the campaign then-Libertas executive director Naoise Nunn 
asserted that the group’s strategy was based around targeting ‘people in the 
mainstream parties who have their doubts’.45 The evidence suggests that this strategy 
proved highly successful. Undoubtedly also divisions and bickering amongst the main 
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parties did not help the Yes case. Taoiseach Brian Cowen accused Fine Gael and 
Labour of not doing enough to make the case for Lisbon.46 In return Fine Gael 
charged that Fianna Fáil had mobilized far later than them and far too late to be 
effective.  
 
The lack of conviction and lacklustre mobilisation efforts of the three largest parties 
tell us something about Irish elites’ approach to and understanding of EU 
membership. There is no evidence of any real internalization of ‘Europe’: 
membership has been perceived in consequentalist and utilitarian (the economic 
benefits reaped) rather than in normative terms (membership as a good in and of 
itself). The enduring localism of Irish party politics means that only a very small 
number of Irish parliamentarians exhibit any interest in European affairs despite the 
ongoing ‘Europeanization’ of more and more areas of domestic policy. It is this lack 
of engagement with and isolation from ‘Europe’ that perhaps best explains the gap 
between party members and elites in respect of recent EU referendums: increasing 
numbers of otherwise loyal party members simply do not take seriously the pleas to 
vote for something which their party elites seem less than reconciled to or enthusiastic 
about.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The rejection of the Lisbon Treaty plunged Ireland into a profound political crisis, not 
least because EU leaders indicated an unwillingness to re-negotiate any part of the 
Treaty: it would be up to Ireland to find an Irish solution to this European problem. 
Coinciding with this impasse in Irish-EU relations an economic recession began to 
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present serious difficulties as the public finances deteriorated to their worst state in 25 
years thus presenting Brian Cowen’s government with the most challenging set of 
circumstances in which to think about moving forward.47 The Irish rejection of 
Lisbon also led directly to ratification problems in other member states as procedures 
were set in motion by Euro-sceptic actors in the Czech Republic, Poland and other 
states to legally challenge domestic ratification processes.  
 
The outcome of the referendum may seem paradoxical to some in that Eurobarometer 
opinion polls of attitudes to the EU continue to demonstrate that Irish people are 
strong supporters of the integration process. The problem is that these favourable 
attitudes vary considerably in intensity. It seems clear from the post-referendum data 
that the pro-European side manifestly failed to provide voters with either normative or 
utilitarian reasons to endorse the Treaty. The ‘soft bloc’ of support for European 
integration crumbled in the face of a vigorous No campaign and a lack of confidence 
among citizens in their ability to understand both the content of the Lisbon Treaty and 
the nature of EU decision-making processes. It may be that even if the referendum fits 
easily into a first –order rather than a second-order image of European politics (in that 
European rather than national or local issues predominated) there were elements of 
the second-order paradigm in evidence. The sense of ‘expressive’ or ‘insincere’ 
voting, defined as voters’ choosing to vote with their hearts rather than minds, is one 
manifestation of this. Certainly, the relatively low turnout level (significantly below 
the general election of 2007) could be viewed as a classic symptom of a second-order 
political event and one lacking salience to the public.  
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Irrespective of this the referendum result was clearly influenced by a double 
disconnect – between political elites and voters on the one hand, and between party 
leaderships and party members on the other. It is difficult to tell whether the result 
indicates the rise of an anti-Establishment politics among the public and the rise of 
anti-system forces on the margins of the political system. On the face of it the success 
of these non-party political actors suggests a new type of politics emerging in Ireland. 
But the result of the 2007 General Election in the Republic would indicate a pretty 
stable and unchanging political order where Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael continue to 
dominate. It is worth remembering that many of the leading exponents of a No vote in 
the Lisbon referendum stood unsuccessfully for election in 2007, despite enjoying 
high profiles in national politics and the opportunities offered by the Irish proportional 
representation system. These included Richard Boyd Barrett of the People Before 
Profit Alliance, Richard Greene of Cóir, Joe Higgins of the Socialist Party, and Mary 
Lou MacDonald of Sinn Féin.  
 
Whilst the article argued that variables such as age, educational attainment, 
geography, gender and social class all have a part to play in explaining the outcome of 
the referendum, post-referendum analysis suggests that two key phenomena proved 
decisive. The Irish attachment to an overwhelmingly exclusivist national identity 
rather than a more open and fluid (including ‘European’) identity means that a space 
exists where issues such as neutrality, sovereignty and Ireland’s relative influence in 
the EU institutional matrix can be readily exploited by opponents of the European 
integration process and where any changes in the EU constitutional order can be 
emotively presented as an existential threat to Ireland’s values and interests. The 
absence of any effort by government to provide and promote a civic education 
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programme or sufficient information channels which explain how and why Ireland’s 
EU membership matters means that EU ‘debates’ within Irish political culture are 
frequently characterised by apathy, confusion, and ignorance, with an increasingly 
wide chasm in elite-popular opinion. Thus ‘lack of knowledge and information’ 
emerge as a key variable is explaining voting behaviour.  
 
There are now real grounds to argue that the Irish No to Lisbon represents the 
culmination of a discernible and growing Eurosceptic voting trend in the Republic of 
Ireland. After all, opposition to the integration project, tracked through the 7 EU-
related referendums held since 1972, demonstrates an increase in the No vote from 
17% in 1972 to 30% in 1987 (Single European Act), to 31% in 1992 (Treaty on 
European Union), to 38% in 1998 (Amsterdam Treaty), a winning majority in the 
Nice referendum of 2001, partly reversed in the second Nice referendum of 2002, but 
culminating in a decisive majority of 53.4% in 2008, on a significantly higher turnout 
than either 2001 or 2002. Whereas the No vote was secured with virtually the same 
percentage of the vote in both 2001 and 2008 (54%), this translates into 529,478 votes 
in 2001 rising to a much larger bloc of support (862,415) in 2008. Such a substantial 
increase in real people voting against an EU Treaty cannot be dismissed as an 
aberration or a statistical outlier attributable to a poor Yes campaign, the ‘stickiness’ 
of Irish identity constructions, or lack of knowledge on the part of citizens, though 
these certainly played their part in the defeat of the Lisbon referendum. Rather it 
points to a solidification of and advance by an increasingly assertive and vocal anti-
European bloc in Ireland which combines tactical astuteness with increasing financial 
backing and organizational sophistication. Whilst most of the major figures within 
this Euro-sceptic movement are located outside of the Oireachtas (and thus outside of 
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mainstream political structures) it is clear that the arguments they expound resonate 
with more and more Irish citizens.  
 
In this sense the rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001 can be viewed as a watershed in 
Ireland’s relationship with the European Union. What it signalled was not just the end 
of the era of ‘permissive consensus’ on EU issues, but that in the absence of 
substantive welfare-enhancing measures which can be effectively communicated to 
citizens, the EU space in Ireland is one where the pro-integration side finds it 
increasingly difficult to persuade voters to match the overwhelming support for 
Ireland’s EU membership with active consent for changes to the EU constitutional 
order and policy agenda. Irish citizens and even committed political party members 
are now quite prepared to disregard party loyalty when confronted with EU 
referendums. An increasingly confrontational (largely British-based) Euro-hostile 
media fan the flames of anti-integration sentiment at every opportunity and provide a 
valuable platform for the Euro-sceptic lobby to disseminate their views.48 The 
tentative measures introduced by the government after 2001 such as the institution of 
a National Forum on Europe clearly have not succeeded in bridging the gap between 
the largely pro-European elites and the mass of Irish citizens: ‘communicating 
Europe’ has become a thankless and unwelcome (if indeed fitfully periodic) task for 
mainstream political representatives rooted in a robustly localist political culture and 
who themselves have both little opportunity to influence EU policy-making and little 
to gain from engaging seriously with EU affairs.49 To add to this the unwillingness on 
the part of the major political parties to confront the Supreme Court on the issue of 
parliamentary prerogatives over constitutional matters means that Ireland is 
condemned to holding referendums within a political space dominated by both 
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nationalist populism and increasing scepticism about the European project. The 
failure of the Lisbon referendum in Ireland thus dramatically and decisively 
confirmed the paradigmatic change in Ireland’s relationship with the European Union 
announced by the No to Nice vote in 2001. At the same time it presented the 
European Union with the latest and perhaps most potent challenge to its ability to 
achieve a balanced and settled European constitutional order against a backdrop of 
global economic retrenchment and geopolitical uncertainty. And whilst the Irish 
Government secured important concessions from the EU at the Brussels European 
Council summit in December 2008, designed to help it conduct a second referendum 
in autumn 2009, all the indications are that the outcome of such a second referendum 
is extremely difficult to predict. 
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